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Castle’s Choice: 
Manipulation, Subversion, and Autonomy


“Mr. Castle,” said Frazier very earnestly, “let me ask you a question.  I warn you that it will be the most terrifying question of your life.  What would you do if you found yourself in possession of an effective science of behavior?  Suppose you suddenly found it possible to control the behavior of men as you wished.  What would you do?”  …  “What would I do,” said Castle thoughtfully, “I think I would dump your science of behavior in the ocean.”

(B. F. Skinner, Walden Two)

Causal Determinism (CD) entails that all of a person’s choices and actions are nomically related to events in the distant past, the approximate, but lawful, consequences of those occurrences.  Assuming that history cannot be undone nor those (natural) relations altered, that whatever results from what is inescapable is itself inescapable, and the contrariety of inevitability and freedom, it follows that we are completely devoid of liberty: our choices are not freely made; our actions are not freely performed.​[1]​
Instead of disputing the soundness of this reasoning, some philosophers prefer to maintain that we could yet have a small measure of freedom were CD true of our world: although being unable to choose or act differently, one could at least under normal circumstances truly claim to be acting ‘on one’s own’, beyond the control of ‘outside forces’, in a word, autonomous.  They further argue that being free in this sense suffices for moral responsibility.  Call their philosophy ‘Autonomy Compatibilism’ (AC).  In adopting here reactive attitudes towards an agent, one is choosing to highlight the fact that the individual in question is of sound mind, reasoning and acting free from the interference of others.  These facts alone, the adherent of AC claims, justify his stance, despite the necessity of the agent’s choices.  Why would we not regard a sane individual who is not being coerced, intimidated, deceived or unduly put upon as in charge of his life so as to be responsible for his activities?  
The Manipulation Argument (MA) is supposed to cut off this line of retreat.  Its authors hold that, were CD true of our world, we would be no more autonomous than a victim of “covert, non-constraining control” (CNC): manipulation whereby one person causes another, through the use of methods such as brainwashing or circumspect operant conditioning, to ‘do his bidding’ without the latter being aware of his subjugation or feeling in any way coerced.​[2]​ Since a CNC victim obviously lacks autonomy, then so must “persons” living in a deterministic universe. Defenders of AC have, then, the following argument with which to contend:

1.	Victims of CNC (obviously) lack autonomy.
2.	Thus, AC would be true only if some definition of autonomy succeeds in specifying a freedom relevant difference between victims of CNC and agents whose choices/actions are necessary consequences of prior events.
3.	There could be no such definition.
4.	Therefore, AC must be false.​[3]​

The challenge issued here is clear: find a way to refute the claim that being subject to natural laws would be tantamount to being a victim of CNC, to show that Nature is no manipulator.  Moreover, this challenge cannot be met by responding with a Frankfurt case: a situation in which things have been surreptitiously arranged so that an agent is unable to avoid doing something that he manages to do ‘on his own’, thus, being autonomous despite his inability to act otherwise.​[4]​ For, even if CD is not inconsistent with autonomy because it eliminates the ability to do otherwise per se, it may yet entail that no human agent ever does act of his own accord, an implication of which would be a lack of alternatives on anyone’s part.​[5]​  In other words, the fact that causally determined beings could never act differently than they do does is perhaps only symptomatic of the reason why such beings would lack autonomy: forces beyond their control would have dominion over their psychological development.  Thus, AC advocates must show that the way that an agent’s character would be shaped, were she (merely) subject to natural laws, would leave unimpaired an ability that CNC would destroy.  What follows is a definition of this ability, which I then use to solve Problem of Freedom and Foreknowledge. 
I
An agent obeying natural laws, I maintain, is yet autonomous for being able to “subvert” the will of others, something that a victim of CNC could not accomplish.  The difference between them is that the former but not the latter could transcend the familiar attitudes, values, principles, preferences, beliefs, judgments, and methods of reasoning that others had managed to instill in her for their purposes, yet are part of the basis of her lifestyle.  CD, unlike CNC, does not mean that an agent would necessarily have imposed upon her forms of life that she would just have to ‘live with’: an upbringing sans CNC would not leave any indelible marks upon a child’s mind set, traits that could not be erased in the natural course of things.  As Gideon Yaffe writes, “When we fall into the hands of (manipulators) fewer lives are available to us than are available to us when we are simply the unlucky victims of neutral causal forces.  …  The more powerful the manipulator, the less that could have happened to intervene to create an agent who responds to reasons in some way other than the way in which the manipulator designs.”​[6]​  Autonomy, on the view being suggested here, is the ability to overcome the influence of others, so as to thwart whatever plans they may have for one.  By destroying this ability, CNC would turn an autonomous agent into the pawn of others.  Accordingly, CNC would be insidious, not simply because it would surreptitiously determine a victim’s mind-set, but because it would allow others to make unwanted or even nefarious use of her agency.
	So what does it mean to say that an agent can subvert the will of others?  Must she be able to supplant any plans that they have instilled?  Would an agent be able to overcome the effects, say, of an irreligious upbringing if (and only if) she could still develop faith?  Consider the following definition:
D1 Necessarily, a person P can subvert the will of an influence P* iff there are goals g and g* such that i) g was intentionally instilled in P by P*, ii) g* is inconsistent with g, iii) P understands what it would mean to adopt g*, iv) P can discern reasons for adopting g*, v) P could become motivated by those reasons to adopt g*​[7]​
Autonomy means being able to rationally develop new projects, independently of the designs of others.  Learning of via one’s mitsein or simply imagining additional pursuits for oneself, one must then be able to determine how well they would comport with the rest of one’s lifestyle: to what extent they would facilitate/hinder the advancement of related concerns.  Out of this examination may emerge reasons for a ‘change of heart’.  An autonomous being would then be able to commence remaking himself should those reasons prove compelling- simply being able to contemplate such activity would obviously not render one autonomous.  We can easily imagine manipulators who would allow someone to think even long and hard about supplanting the initiatives they have instilled, having, though, afflicted him with the inability to realize the force of any reasons for doing so.   There must, then, be circumstances (perhaps remote) that would cause one, upon reflection, to seek such a ‘change of heart’.  
To see why it is too broad, however, consider the case of Mary, whose adoption of a hedonistic lifestyle will be the response that had been intended by the same CNC employing cult leaders who are also responsible for her having adopted their form of asceticism in the first place: they have further arranged things so that this transformation will occur (to quiet media reports of their having engaged in wide-spread brainwashing).​[8]​  Despite being able to abandon the cult’s lifestyle, Mary is still ‘under the sway’ of those parties, given her inability to act against their will.  To be autonomous, she would have to be able, not only to supplant the original initiatives they have bred in her, but replace them with ones that they did not intend for her to adopt.  That is, she must be able to subvert whatever plans they have for her:
D2 Necessarily, a person P can subvert the will of an influence P* iff there are goals g and g* such that i) g was intentionally instilled in P by P*, ii) g* is inconsistent with g, iii) P understands what it would mean to adopt g*, iv) P can discern reasons for adopting g*, v) P could become motivated by those reasons to adopt g*, and vi) P* does not intend that P adopt g*

	Adding vi makes it clear that, in desiring autonomy, it is ultimately other persons’ control from which one wishes to be free: the ability to abandon any particular influence being necessary but not sufficient for its achievement.   Being autonomous means being able to escape whatever conatative influences provide the means of its exercise.  Causal determined influences sans CNC would leave this ability intact: a normal upbringing, e.g., allows a child to repudiate everything that her parents ‘stand for’.  What also emerges from this account is that an autonomous agent does not establish himself as such.  Credit here should go to those persons who refrained from doing something that would have rendered him subject to their will: he owes his (measure of) freedom to their willingness to be subverted- to provide him with guidance without making him their pawn (leaving aside her relation to God, which will be discussed below) either by destroying her ability to think critically regarding that same guidance or by systematically eliminating the opportunities for its exercise.
	What if the possibility of an agent satisfying D2’s definiens is remote?  What if it is highly unlikely that she will abandon a life plan that someone has instilled in favor of one that he had not intended for her to adopt?  Would she then still remain in his control-thus failing to be free- despite being able to transcend his influence?  An advocate of the MA could contend that if an agent satisfies the definiens of D2 only because of what happens in a “distant” (physically) possible world, then her ability is not robust enough to distinguish her from a victim of CNC.  T2, then, appears to be too narrow, as those satisfying its definiens would yet be limited.  
But an unexercised instance of the ability entailed by D2 still affords its possessor at least a small measure of freedom from others’ control: let us concede, then, that autonomy comes in various degrees; that some individuals are more autonomous than others. A good parent, even as she respects her child’s autonomy, may still wish to instill in him certain goals- for his own well-being.  She would want him, amongst other things, to abhor violence.  Valuing autonomy, however, she would forswear CNC to achieve this end.  Unlike an omniscient manipulator, she would not be applying impeccable logic to her knowledge of the universe and its laws to make sure that he does her bidding.  That is not to say that she intends to fail: she would still be trying very hard to turn her son into a gentleman, doing all that she can save that which would destroy the violate D2. Her due diligence, then, would undoubtedly make it extremely difficult for him to strike another person in anger- ‘he just wouldn’t have that in him’.  Nevertheless, as long as she does not use CNC (or some other form of domination), he remains autonomous; she has not ‘crushed his will’.  Thus, even if, in the end his upbringing has proven effective in making him mild-mannered, his satisfaction of D2 means that all along the possibility of aggression was there, so that he was all the while free of her.  In the unlikely event that her influence had put him at a disadvantage, say in a time of war, he could have jettisoned her plans in favor of others that he would not have been able to adopt but for her willingness to be overcome, so as to grant him autonomy.  Given that it was his good fortune that an exigency never arose, he should not be thought of as having lacked autonomy for having sustained a lifestyle that, we shall suppose, served him well.  
	D2 defines the object of the desire for autonomy: to be uncontrollable by other persons.  Unlike victims of CNC, those who satisfy the definiens of D2 are able reflect upon the impact others have had on their lives: they would be able to doubt the wisdom and/or motives of their parents, teachers, friends, peers, mentors, employers, and rulers. What’s more, having done so, subversion becomes a live option, something with which those other individuals must reckon.  On this understanding of autonomy, it is not enough to be able to do otherwise, to act differently than one actually does.  As reflected in the emendation of D1, one must also be able to do other than what the above individuals intend for one; to spoil their plans.  Moreover, D2 allows for akrasia, as it does not entail that an autonomous agent would revise his life plan in every possible world in which it is disadvantageous.  
Is D2, perhaps, too broad still?  Is it not possible to have one’s will impaired by “blind forces”?  What of an agent whose values are radically altered by a neurological disorder resulting from an automobile accident?  Has he lost his autonomy?​[9]​ Not if he retains the ability to re-acquire his old values or develop new ones.  Such impairments do not work to keep their victims impaired.  Moreover, since blind forces cannot intend that someone retain or develop character traits to suit their purposes, “they” are incapable of exercising control over anyone.  A neurological disorder that radically alters an agent’s values violates his will, for sure.  Yet, it need not ‘break’ it; he may remain capable of overcoming its effects.  Similarly, if someone is genetically predisposed to violence, well then, he has a heavy burden to bear in life.  But, as long as he satisfies D2 there are easily imaginable circumstances in which he acquires self-control- his situation is far from hopeless.  His condition, disturbing though it is, is a far cry from the predicaments of Derk Pereboom’s “Prof. Plum” 1/2/3 or Al Mele’s “Ernie.”  Those individuals, having had their lives hijacked by others, will not only never know who they really are, but, worse still, can never surmount their plight, their misery being inescapable.  Violation has left an indelible mark on their very being.  Let us examine these cases and the manipulation arguments based upon them to establish this crucial difference.  
Pereboom’s “Four Cases” argument is analogical.​[10]​ He provides four different anatomies of a murder and extends his analysis of the three CNC cases to the one involving CD.  Once we see that the fact explaining the lack of autonomy in cases 1-3 also obtains in case 4, we are supposed to conclude that there is none there either.  The first is his paradigm: evil scientists create a Prof. Plum and, subsequently micromanaging his brain via radio signals, instill in him the desire to kill a Mr. White as well as the second-order to desire to retain that murderous urge.  They proceed using the same technology to make the killing appear more advantageous than heeding his moral qualms.  All of this information is finally processed as the effect of their signaling along rational egoist lines, the end result being White’s murder.  Plum 2 and 3 are like Plum 1 except that they have been caused to murder by programming and a harsh upbringing respectively.  Pereboom then accounts for each Plum’s lack of autonomy by citing the fact that his behavior is determined by forces “beyond his control.”​[11]​ Isn’t this fact’s compatibility with autonomy, though, the very point at issue?  More importantly, isn’t there something even more salient about the cases?  The problem, one would think, is not that they are being caused to do things by external forces per se, but that they are being dominated by other persons whose wills they cannot subvert.  That is, their failure to satisfy D2 is what entails their lack of autonomy, not the mere existence of causal connections between their doings and events in which they are not involved. Thus, there is another way of explaining this absence that does not beg the question against AC.  This explanation, however, is not true of Plum 4, also a murderer, but whose upbringing is assumed to be normal.  The cases, thus, turn out to be disanalogous, leaving us with no reason to believe that Plum 4 lacks autonomy.
Pereboom concedes that “maybe it turns out that on (D2), an agent’s being manipulated is sufficient for (a lack of autonomy on his part).”​[12]​  But he further maintains that “this does not all by itself help show that causal determinism is not also sufficient for and explains (that defiency). For none of this undermines the claim that manipulation would be one way to ensure causal circumstances that preclude autonomy-relevant control, while causal determination is another.”​[13]​  But, again, why would anyone  but a committed incompatibilist think that causal determination all by itself precludes control of this sort (rather than enhances it, considering the Mind objection to Libertarianism)? The autonomy relevant difference between Plum 1-3 and 4 is that the former but not the latter lack the ability defined by D2. If his manipulators have programmed Plum 2, e.g., so that any critical thinking in which he might engage is guaranteed to issue an endorsement of their goals, then he must remain conatively subject to their will.  Compare his captivity to the tenuous hold a typical parent has on his/her children or advertisers have on consumers.  
What if the underlying reason for Plum 1/2/3’s lack of autonomy is their failure to be the origin of the “springs of their actions,” Pereboom’s portrayal of them as being manipulated serving only to highlight this more basic concern?  Perhaps the relevant similarity between them and anyone the approximate causes of whose actions are forces beyond his control is the inability to be the ultimate source of one’s doings?  In that case, satisfaction of D2 may be beside the point: thought it means one is free from manipulation, it does not entail that one autonomous in the sense of being the maker of oneself.​[14]​
The question is, does my thesis run afoul of a version of Galen Strawson’s “Origination Argument”: we lack autonomy for being unable to make ourselves out of autonomously chosen reasons.​[15]​ The impossibility of autonomy, according to this argument, would stem from one’s having to autonomously choose one’s reasons for making one’s choices for those choices to be themselves autonomous.  Since one has not been choosing forever, one must have made one’s initial choices on the basis of reasons one did not autonomously choose.  But, then, one cannot autonomously begin the project of character development, given the requirement of autonomously chosen reasons.  One is left with a character for which one can take no credit, its material cause, as an Aristotelian would put it, having been arbitrary.  
I do not share, however, Strawson’s intuition that it is impossible for one to autonomously choose all of one’s reasons.  It seems to me that it is sufficient in this regard that one satisfy D2 in relation to anyone who has ever supplied one with potential reasons.  Let us suppose that I choose a particular course of action (or even a belief) on the basis of a certain desire.  This preference, we shall further assume, was instilled in me by an influential relation and surfaced unbidden.  So this desire was itself not chosen by me to be my desire.  Yet it was not unselected as a reason; it did not rise to the level of a motive sans rational vetting on my part.  On the basis of this evaluation, I choose it over competing desires as my motive, as my reason for that particular course of action.  (Or, were it without competition, I at least sanctioned it as fit to offer as justification for embarking thereupon.)  Should I satisfy D2 regarding whoever was responsible for whatever reasons became decisive, I could have decided not only differently, but against his wishes.  There was, then, nothing constraining my choice: in making it, I was free of others’ control.  You will say that this choice of a reason must itself be based upon reasons autonomously chosen.  Fair enough.  But, though that decision may not actually have been taken, so as to put an end to cogitation and ‘get on with things’, though the vetting of the reason for the choice of my reason may, in the interest of time, yet to be conducted, if I satisfy D2 in relation to the source of that reason, it cannot be an instrument of my being manipulated- it does not entail, simply for having avoided scrutiny, a loss of autonomy.  I have merely put off the exercise of reasoning skills in no way impaired by others’ machinations.  I have here, then, as much freedom as one should want given my subjection to natural laws: the ability to continually assess my mind-set in conducting my affairs without fear of being surreptitiously controlled by others.  Exercises of this ability in the service of self-realization should not be seen as merely the “unfolding of the given, to use Saul Smilansky’s apt phrase, since one is doing on one’s own all the necessary labor, autonomously molding heredity so as to form oneself.
Mele’s manipulation argument is based on the case of Ernie, the adult descendent of a zygote artificially implanted in a womb specifically for the purpose of having a certain act performed.​[16]​ He is very much like the programmed Prof. Plum in that his cells have been arranged by his omniscient creator so that, given the laws of nature, he will eventually become the instrument of another’s will, the only difference being that he will proceed through the normal stages of human development.  Mele further stipulates that there will be no “unsheddable values” motivating the intended act.  His manipulation argument is then given as follows:
1.	Ernie is (obviously) not autonomous.
2.	There is no freedom relevant difference between (the act of) Ernie’s creation and the normal (deterministic) process by which human beings come into existence.
3.	Thus, the latter lack autonomy.
Notice firstly that Mele’s stipulation does not entail Ernie’s satisfaction of D2, for though no unsheddable value was involved in the production of his action, it was not possible for him to subvert the will of his creator so as to avoid having that action as part of some plan.  It should then become clear in light of the preceding discussion that Mele’s second premise is false: the efficient cause of the normal process by which we are created, depending on one’s theology, is either Nature or God Almighty, neither of which is capable of violating D2.  Autonomy is the ability to adopt goals as one sees fit, free of constraints imposed by others.  An autonomous agent would be able to change his mind about the desirability of performing a certain action, coming to favor alternatives.  In not satisfying D2, due to his creator’s handiwork, Bernie cannot make such a break with the past.
II

	It has probably not escaped the reader’s attention that D2 also entails a solution to the problem of freedom and foreknowledge.  According to St. Augustine, this problem runs as follows:​[17]​
1.	If God knew what I was going to do in a given situation, then my action was necessary.
2.	If my action was necessary, then it was not freely willed.
3.	Thus, if God knew what I was going to do in a given situation, then my action was not freely willed.
4.	God knew what I was going to do in every situation in which I found myself.
5.	Thus, none of my actions were freely willed.

As Linda Zagzebski points out, the Compatibilist solution to this problem can be stated in one sentence: premise 2 is false.​[18]​ This claim can be bolstered, however, by appealing to D2.  
Think of God as having made Castle’s choice, forswearing the use of CNC to insure that people act in accord with His will.  He granted us autonomy, then, in the sense that we can do things that He did not intend, should they seem advantageous.  Even if one does obey His commandments, it is not because transgressing them was something of which one was rendered incapable by God himself.  God, having left intact her capacity for subversion, is not responsible for the righteous person’s following of His dictates: only if He had guaranteed that course of conduct would it be something for which He, not she, would be praiseworthy.   Instead, God chose to allow her to contravene His will, doing nothing Himself to keep her from seeing His commandments as disadvantageous.  Neither she nor her circumstances were tailored to the other so as to achieve her righteousness: God did not dispose her to act according to His will, knowing the situations she would be facing, nor did He arrange things so that she would only face situations in which she would follow His commandments, given her dispositions.  She was placed on this earth much as a coach sends a player into a game.  Thus, for all He did, she can subvert His influence, making her autonomous (at least in relation to Him).  Of course, God would know in advance, whether or not an agent is (actually) going to exercise her ability to rebel against His authority in a particular situation, which entails the necessity of whatever gets done therein.  Nevertheless, He is not in control of her, given her possession of that ability.
God is responsible for our being, not for what we do, nor what we make of our lives.  He does not determine our actions, though our characters and circumstances do.  It is one thing to bring someone into existence subsequently to relinquish control; it is a completely different matter to arrange things for one’s creatures to carry out one’s intentions, as in the above manipulation scenarios.  That a series of events originates in a person does not entail responsibility on his part for any of its parts.  It depends crucially on the manner in which they are produced.  Our satisfaction of D2 in relation to God negates whatever praise/blame he would otherwise have had for what we do.  Pace Calvin, he does not determine our characters either.  A character is simply not the sort of thing that can be bestowed upon one; one can’t become who one is all at once, as it were.  A character not only takes time to develop; it must be the result of one’s autonomous choices.  There is, then, no reason for thinking that God is guilty of CNC; in fact, being goodness itself, He could not manipulate us. (Or, if one is an atheist, there should be no such concern.)  And blind forces, as noted above, cannot control one: where willfulness is lacking there is no dominion.  Thus, we can satisfy D2 in relation to Him, expressing ourselves as we develop our characters.  Yes, as conceded above, no human creates himself ex nihilo.  But in the natural course of events, left to one’s own devices, one becomes what one intends to be.
Is our freedom consistent with divine omnipotence?  The gift of autonomy, as I prefer to think of it, must be freely given, assuming that nothing is necessary unless divinely willed.  It is further revocable at any time, exercisable only at His discretion, and meant for His glory.  There is moreover nothing we could do with it that cannot be undone by Him.  Therefore, it does not entail a surrender of any of His power to allow us to become “perfect like Him” through the exercise of a measure of His freedom.  On the other hand, the question of opportunity arises here: would a sinner facing punishment, having misused that gift, have a legitimate excuse for his wrongdoing in that his exercises of his ability to rebel were determined by factors beyond his control?  After all, we have conceded that we have only a measure of freedom; that we do not create ourselves ex nihilo. Fairness would seem to require that a sinner be given the chance to atone, hence the idea of purgatory.  In that case, however, the deck would seem to be stacked in a sinner’s favor: it is hard to imagine someone choosing to rebel when facing eternal damnation.​[19]​ I may set this issue aside, however, as my goal was to establish that those who do obey the commandments do so autonomously, even if their obedience is determined.
Some may finally charge that this compatibilist philosophy of character formation does not comport with standard theodicies.  According to them, evil is a function of our libertarian freedom: our choices being undetermined.  God, it is said, could not have created a world sans evil without determining our choices.  But if some form of compatibilism is true, why shouldn’t He be arranging things so that we free creatures always act morally?  The answer, as suggested above, is that evil results from God having (lovingly) ceded control of our lives, that is, from our satisfying D2 vis-a-vis Him.  God cannot make free creatures who always do what is right- that is, His will- because that would mean either depriving us of the ability to subvert His will or granting us this ability and then arranging things so that it was never exercised. It is obvious why we would not be autonomous had He not granted us this ability; what is not as clear is the reason for not exercising the latter option. (Though one would not lack autonomy for having lost this ability as the result of virtuous autonomous activity aided by His grace, a’la those in Heaven.)  One could ask, however, wouldn’t exercising the latter option be tantamount to exercising the former? Moreover, if God did not want His will subverted at all, it would have been simpler, it seems, to just not grant the above ability rather than grant it and then insure that it is never exercised. Thus, to make us fully autonomous, it appears that God could do nothing to make evil non-existent: he could neither of the things that would have made Him solely responsible for the prevention of evil. He had to grant us both the ability to commit evil acts and opportunities for its exercise. I believe that that is why Christians pray “lead us not into temptation but deliver us from evil.” We know fully well what we are capable of and likely to do in certain circumstances, so we ask the Almighty to arrange things so that they do not occur. But if He does, then we are at least partly responsible for doing His will; it is not a case of moral luck as it would be had the arrangement been made sans the request, that is, had God exercised option two above.  
Conclusion
Neither obeying of natural laws nor being God’s creature is tantamount to being a victim of CNC: there is a freedom entailing difference between a choice that is (simply) the necessary outcome of prior events and one that is the inevitable result of a plot.  D2 defines an ability possessed only by those who have not been subjected to CNC.  Such persons are not being controlled by anyone else, which is all that those who value autonomy should fear.  My account further suggests that autonomy should not be looked at as something that one develops, though it is a precondition of self-realization.  It should be seen, instead, as a gift, bestowed by those significant others (including God, if one is a theist) who made Castle’s choice in regards to one’s existence.​[20]​


Comments for the Author:
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-   But, though that decision may not actually have been taken, so as to put an end to cogitation and ‘get on with things’, though the vetting of the reason for the choice of my reason may, in the interest of time, is yet to be conducted, if I satisfy D2 in relation to those source of that reason, is cannot be an instrument of my being manipulated- it does not entail, simply for having avoided scrutiny, a loss of autonomy." 

- Thus, to make us fully autonomous, it appears that God could do nothing to make evil non-existent: he could do neither of the things that would have made Him solely responsible for the prevention of evil. 
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